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A Political Sociology of Populism and Leadership 
Lorenzo Viviani 
In the face of change in the social bases of advanced European democracies, politics has delayed the 
articulation of new cleavages characterising a society that can no longer be attributed to the perimeter 
of belonging and the social classes of the 20th century. The crisis is therefore not an expression of criti-
cism against democracy as a political regime per sé, but rather corresponds to a crisis in the legitimacy 
of traditional political players. The democratic deficit feeding populism is not weakened by the claimed 
desire to broaden the participatory dimension of politics, insomuch as it derives from the loss of collective 
references in a society divided in new winners and new losers of globalization and in the midst of a crisis 
of the concept of equality. These aspects shall be analysed further as part of the interpretation of pop-
ulism as a phenomenon comprising an appeal to the people and an opposition to the élite. The purpose 
of this paper is to address the issue of the politicization of anti-establishment sentiment, where populism 
is considered not so much as an ideolog y but as a political strateg y of politicization of the rift between 
society and politics, where political leaders and parties are the key players in shaping the disaffection of 
the people toward the traditional mass politics.
1. Introduction: understanding populism in advanced democracies
The relationship between populism and leadership plays a key role in the 
reconfiguration of political forms and players in the lengthy, and not without 
contradictions, transition from a democracy of political parties and ideolo-
gies to a democracy characterized by the personalization of politics and top 
political leaders. (Cavalli 1987a; McAllister 2007; Poguntke and Webb 2009; 
Karvonen 2010; Garzia 2014). In Economy and Society, Max Weber ([1922] 
1978: 1126) maintained that «charisma is not alien to all modern, including 
all democratic, forms of election». Similarly, we could identify in populism a 
characteristic that, with varying degrees of intensity, belongs to many of the 
personalized examples of leadership present in advanced democracies. Whilst 
not all forms of populism were historically expressed through the personaliza-
tion of leadership, it is nonetheless true that one of the inherent characteristics 
of populism, i.e. the lack of a well-defined conceptual and ideological core, 
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lends itself well to the «politics of personality» (Taggart 2000: 101), making it 
difficult not to consider the role of leadership in its development (Moffitt 2016: 
55). Populism can be analysed from different perspectives: the ideological di-
mension, political discourse as a communication style or the strategy adopted 
by a political movement (Gidron and Bonikowski 2014). At the same time, the 
perspectives under which the literature on populism and leadership was de-
veloped endorsed different aspects of the types of modernization and democ-
ratization. Whereas in Europe the literature on political transformation has 
focused on political parties, the relationship amongst them and on social frac-
tures, in other contexts, including in South America, the political leadership 
has taken on, since the first half of the 20th century, a major role in the inter-
pretation of political phenomena. For populism, this means that the prospect 
of leadership has been addressed in direct relation with nation-state building 
in contexts devoid of aggregation and of the articulation of party interests. 
(Di Tella 1965; Germani 1975). Conversely, in Europe, studies on populism 
developed alongside the growing phenomenon of anti-establishment parties, 
specifically, in relation to the birth of the parties of the new radical right (Betz 
and Immerfall 1998; Ignazi 2003). 
For the purposes of this paper, we will consider how and to what extent 
the centrality of the leadership is able to explain the rise of populism in the 
current transformation of European democracies, in addition to performing 
a classic analysis of political movements and parties, and, at the same time, 
examining the internal developments introduced by leader democracy in 
Europe. Within the scope of the various perspectives fuelling the debate on 
populism, the focal point remains the analysis of the procedural phenomenon 
in which populism is adopted as a particular political strategy and style of 
politicization and mobilization (Weyland 2001; Jansen 2011; Roberts 2015; 
Moffitt 2016; Pappas 2016). By examining populist leadership, we can analyse 
the crisis of representation that has arisen at a time of separation of power 
and politics, the weakening forms of organized politics in nation states, the 
place of 20th century liberal democracy, and the shift in power at global level, 
which is dominated primarily by finance and which has lost its legitimacy as 
a result of being the subject of political conflict (Bazzicalupo 2010). In such 
a context, leadership becomes the instrument and vehicle by which we can 
highlight the political identity building mechanism in the current period of 
misalignment in a hyper-fragmented and individualized society.
In pursuing this line of argument, populism and leadership constitute phe-
nomena that are both complementary and distinctive, particularly when re-
calling concepts whereby sociological analysis is called upon to organise, not 
in a formal manner but rather in a substantial way, the concepts of leader 
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democracy, populist leadership and charismatic leader. Therefore, this per-
spective does not aim to reconstruct the history or the semantics of populism 
based on the ideological affinity of its different manifestations, but rather it 
focuses on the dynamics of the political strategy adopted by the new lead-
ers of modern democracies. Based on the definition of leadership as a social 
relationship composed of three key elements, i.e. the leader, the followers, the 
context in which they interact (Nye 2009: 26), we shall analyse the politiciza-
tion of no-confidence/distrust and anti-party sentiment, which is revealed in 
a process of redefinition of the political, institutional and democratic sphere. 
The aim is to reconstruct a type of populist leadership through its actions and 
interactions with voters, and verify the ways of appealing to the “people” and 
the creation of a radical opposition to the political establishment.
2. Populism in an era of personalization of politics
In order to understand populism, we must not only ask ourselves what it is, 
but in what way, how and by whom it can be developed. For this reason, it 
is worth starting from the taxonomy proposed by Margaret Canovan of the 
various types of populism, in order to grasp the role of leadership in the dy-
namics of populism found in modern democracies. Margaret Canovan (1981: 
13) offers us the chance to identify two macro types of populism, one of which 
can be defined as agrarian populism, the “farmer radicalism” of the Ameri-
can People’s Party in the 19th century, the movement of peasants in Eastern 
Europe and the Russian Narodniks, whilst the other refers to the category of 
“political populisms”. This first distinction allows us to establish a difference 
between populist movements, with a bottom-up trend, which are not focused 
on leadership, and types of movements that differ based on social, historical 
and economic contexts, and enjoy a special relationship with a political lead-
er. Political populisms include dictatorial phenomena, “populist democracy” 
declinations, reactionary populism (or rather, nationalist reactivation) and a 
broad view of the “populism of politicians”. If we choose to disregard the 
forms of Caesarism and the reactions to progress, the references to original 
and traditional forms of community and referendum democracy, the aspect 
that opens up to more perspectives for the analysis of contemporary populism 
in relation to phenomena characterising advanced democracies is the aspect 
related to the «catch-all people’s party» (Canovan 1981: 260-261). 
Populism is presented and established in a context marked by the long-
term thawing of classic rifts, which not only involves the organizational trans-
formation of parties, but also questioning the legitimacy of representative 
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democracy, which is mediated by parties as a linkage between institutions 
and society. A process without any particular balance, in which mass parties 
can legitimise the “sharing of political work” between the ruling classes and 
citizens, in the name of shared ideological affiliations. In the compromise of 
party democracy, the legitimization of the unequal distribution of power was 
anchored in the ability of parties to not only connect the élite, the member-
ship and the voters from a procedural and electoral standpoint, but also to 
create a process of identity integration by connecting individuals and groups, 
parties and society, the media, collateral organizations and the government 
(Lawson 1980). Upsetting the balance by overlooking the social integration of 
parties is the basis for the “crisis” of political representation in which the gap 
between the political élites and individuals is widened (Manin 2010: 259). In 
this context, of increasing relevance is the tension between the dynamics of 
advanced modernization, which alter the social bases of democracy, and the 
political re-articulation/reorganization of social divisions, with the collapse of 
political modernization in the definition of new cleavage politics (Bornschier 
2010). In other words, the political class consolidates attributions of power 
by inserting itself in the institutions from which it gains financial resources 
and elevated status (Katz and Mair 2009), but, at the same time, politics is 
incapable of social regulation in increasingly complex societies. The crisis of 
political representation resulting from the gap between society and politics 
manifests as the radicalization of the deideologization of parties described 
by Kirchheimer in the 1960s and 1970s as “catch-all parties”. In light of the 
absence of cohesive social groups, which are no longer bound by the bind-
ing and identifying role of party ideology, of increasing importance, on the 
one hand, is the immediate relationship of the individual with politics and 
of the individual politician with the potential voter and, on the other, the 
process by which the top powers are bolstered by monocratic mandates. The 
personalization of politics becomes the determining process in the transition 
to leader democracy, from the candidate-centred nature of the elections, not 
just in Anglo-Saxon democracies, but in all advanced European democracies, 
including those with a parliamentary government (Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005; Aarts, Blais and Schmitt 2011). This per-
sonalization constitutes the shift from the centrality of the collective bodies to 
that of the individual players in the reporting process of political choice and 
the establishment of political identity (Cavalli 1994; Karvonen 2010). Along-
side this process, which expresses at political level what happens in society 
under the pressure of individualization, is presented the redefinition of power 
with growing attributions that shift from collective bodies to monocratic top 
leadership mandates; a complete redefinition of accountability that involves 
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three complementary dimensions, i.e. of the government, of political parties 
and, in general, of electoral processes (Poguntke and Webb 2005: 352). The 
relationship of trust which was built in the past between citizens and leaders 
shifts: if in the past the reference was identifying with the party through a 
bond based on ideology, today that reference is the leader who contributes 
to the creation of the basis for a political relationship. In a context in which 
the complexity of choices increases, it is no paradox that cognitive simplifica-
tion, which is no longer operated by ideology and its political interpreters, 
is not offered by detailed policy programmes but by the leader himself. The 
biographies of the leaders or their image, which is created by professionals 
and spread by the media, take on the role of policy programme summary 
in a direct relationship, which, in its most radical form, can be traced back/
connected to not only “audience democracy”, where the audience hears the 
words of the leader, but also “ocular democracy”, where choice and electoral 
sanction are no longer articulated in the words but through the vision and 
behaviour of the political actor (Green 2010). 
It would however be misleading to presume that leader democracy cor-
responds to a party-free democracy, given that parties continue to perform 
an important role in both election procedures and the selection of political 
staff. What has changed is the fact that parties now support leaders instead of 
operating as collective bodies in political mediation. They gradually become 
professionalized party machines, in which the traditional élites are replaced 
with new élites chosen directly by the leader, whom he trusts and who are 
accountable to him, whose legitimacy is indirect, i.e. derived from the very 
legitimacy granted to the leader by voters (Pakulski and Körösényi 2012: 
148). If personalization becomes the key to the transformation of advanced 
democracies, then the formation of new fractures and the politicization of no-
confidence and anti-establishment sentiment will feature strongly in the per-
sonalization of politics and leadership. Reacting to a democracy deprived of 
its identity, planning, even utopian, components become part of a repertoire 
of ideas and practices where the people’s sovereignty and “policy of redemp-
tion”, as opposed to a purely procedural and pragmatic policy, give substance 
to the populist project (Canovan 1999; Meny and Surel 2002). Where main-
stream politics has adopted the character and practice of cartelization, fa-
vourable conditions are gradually created for the emergence and development 
of anti-party and anti-political-establishment parties (Mudde 1996; Schedler 
1996) in which the leadership takes on the central role of the opposition. The 
populist leader simultaneously becomes the actor and director of the con-
flict between the people and the élite in a production where the leader is the 
symbol of the incompatibility with a lacklustre and impersonal élite class, to 
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be blamed for the cultural distrust felt towards parties which have existed in 
various forms from the beginning.
3. Crisis of political representation and development of populism
Populism originated and developed by exploiting the opportunities arising 
from a sentiment of disenchantment with party politics, on the one hand, and 
on the other, by attempting to make anti-politics politically active and elector-
ally significant on a mass level. Although the attribute “populist” is associated 
with a degenerative and potentially dangerous phenomenon for democracy, 
populism de facto lies within the confines of representative democracy, albeit 
peripherally (Arditi 2005). Indeed, to emerge and develop, populism requires 
representative democracy, that is to say a democratic procedural context in 
which to propose a new political and electoral option through a political par-
ty. At the same time, a hypothetical “crisis” of representation starts with the 
different changes to the social bases of democracy and, as a result, with the 
relationship between modernization, democratization and the role of “politi-
cal entrepreneurs” within a power struggle. As a disease of liberal democracy 
or as a thermometer measuring the ineffective responsiveness of its actors, 
populism connotes a challenge to the reconfiguration of democracy based 
on new versions of popular sovereignty and constitutional guarantees for the 
protection of minority groups (Taggart 2002; Deiwiks 2009). Like a «drunken 
guest at a dinner party», populism behaves like an unwanted guest “of” and 
“in” democracy, underlining the need to rethink the linkage between citizens 
and politics, as well as the very contents of representation and with it, the 
entire legitimation process of those in power (Arditi 2005: 90-91). Populism 
is characterized by contradictions, starting with the fact that it articulates 
anti-party discourse, but resorts to party form itself, or that it calls for popular 
participation but that it secures it by simply garnering support for personal-
ized forms of leadership.
Populism can emerge in any stage of the relationship between moderniza-
tion and democracy and in contexts that differ according to economic struc-
ture and political culture, as a result of three possible types of crisis of repre-
sentation (Roberts 2015: 147-149). The first of these refers to classic populism 
in South America, called upon to incorporate large heterogeneous masses, 
without social and political references, organized by parties and trade unions 
in a democratic political system. The second type involves a lack of legiti-
macy resulting from the weak institutionalization of a representation system 
still largely in formation, an example being the new democracies of Eastern 
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Europe. The third type corresponds to what is happening in advanced Eu-
ropean democracies, particularly the process by which parties reinforce their 
position in public office, but as a result lose their social and ideological anchor 
and become more and more powerful but less legitimate. In this last example, 
populism represents a “negative” challenge to parties in favour of overcom-
ing traditional democratic conflict by resorting to the plebiscitary investiture 
of a leader and a policy of no confidence in democracy tout court. The popu-
list challenge to representative democracy can also insert previously excluded 
groups or issues in the circle of representation, it can build an ideological 
bridge that supports the creation of new social and political coalitions, it can 
increase democratic accountability by including new issues and policies in the 
political system, and it can contribute, like an exogenous shock, to redefining 
mainstream political parties, movements and public opinion to strengthen the 
democratization of democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012: 21). 
The activation of populism as an alarm for the declining representation 
of mainstream politics calls into question the very nature of the actions of a 
community associated with a political party. Indeed, the party, in its Webe-
rian definition, aims at a «goal which is striven for in a planned manner. This 
goal may be a cause (the party may aim at realizing a program for ideal or 
material purposes), or the goal may be personal (sinecures, power, and from 
these, honor for the leader and the followers of the party). Usually the party 
aims at all these simultaneously» (Weber [1922] 1978: 938). A legitimization 
crisis of traditional political subjects erupts when there is no longer a balance 
between pursuing a shared project, strengthening the political class’s power, 
and the pursuit by citizens/voters of ideals or socio-economic interests. There-
fore, there is not just an identity crisis for political parties, but also a crisis 
regarding the effectiveness of mainstream parties in improving the conditions 
of their constituents. This step includes a crisis of representation, attributable 
to the actions of a community that loses all references to the constituencies as 
a result of the classic fractures of cleavage politics. This crisis, in the different 
institutional forms it has adopted over time, is not new to democratic politics; 
it is worth bearing in mind that the party’s sociological structure as a political 
actor changes «according to the kind of social action which they struggle to 
influence; that means, they differ according to whether or not the community 
is stratified by status or by classes» (Idem: 938-939).
The primary ambivalence of the populist hypothesis is rooted in the com-
mon characteristic of post-ideological democracies, i.e. disintermediation to 
overcome the importance of intermediate bodies in terms of information, of 
identity building and voting choice in the political sphere. The re-articulation 
of the linkage between politics and institutions occurs gradually under the 
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personalization of the leadership, whose relationship with voters, politiciza-
tion of new fractures, and creation of new parties varies according to the type 
of leader. At the centre of this process lies the prospect of radicalization, which 
undermines liberal democracy, starting with the absence of separate “politi-
cal bodies” and “personal bodies”, and the resulting change in the nature of 
power as a depersonalized institutional place. In a crisis of representation, 
populism arises and develops as a process of dissolution of the divide between 
the sphere of the individual and the sphere of power, as part of a push to 
«re-embody the body politics», in the name of the people and by acting as a 
lever on the unification of same through the leader (Moffitt 2016: 64). There 
are two newly configured forms of linkage: participatory linkage, which is 
characterized by tools encouraging the re-appropriation of an active role for 
individuals in the planning of political programmes or the selection of politi-
cal staff; and electoral linkage, particularly in its declination of plebiscitary 
linkage, in which the leader replaces the parties by representing the “people” 
as a whole, thus giving form to a populist perspective (Barr 2009: 35).
The disarticulation of political affiliations and growing anti-establishment 
sentiment amongst the electorate finds in the populist leader a model repre-
sentative for “anti-political politics”, insomuch as the person becomes a sym-
bol of opposition to the politics of the party oligarchy. This process leads to 
the transformation of the very relationship between engagement, participa-
tion and mobilization, given that affiliation is decided by the sentiment felt 
towards the leader. Populist plebiscitarism is presented as a specific sub-type 
of democracy with a leader, i.e. populist democracy (Canovan 2002), or rather 
democracy with a populist leader. The latter emerges in connection with the 
loss of balance in mass democracy between procedural elements, embodied 
by liberal constitutional guarantees, and popular sovereignty (Meny and Surel 
2002). In other words, the populist political option taken into consideration in 
this context opposes democracy as a process, «a claim to legitimacy that rests 
on the democratic ideology of popular sovereignty and majority rule» (Cano-
van 2002: 25). In the vacuum of collective affiliations, populism challenges 
liberal democracies, by presenting itself as a salvific form of “identity” and 
“redemption”, with a political/theology connotation focused on the category 
of friend/enemy and the mysticism of the people (Canovan 1999; Arato 2015).
Populist plebiscitarism is an option, even if it is part of the personalization 
of post-party democracy; however, it differs from leader democracy and the 
prospects of participatory and deliberative democracy. Calling a referendum 
or adopting deliberative practices are not used to promote a bottom-up par-
ticipation, but rather to deconstruct representative mediations. In this sense, 
populist plebiscitarism radicalises the prospect of audience democracy and 
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leader democracy. The leader is not just the redistribution of shares in power 
from the organization to the top; he becomes a symbol of the opposition to 
representative politics, an antidote to the democracy of corrupt and self-ref-
erential political parties. In other words, populist democracy is anti-elitist, in 
addition to being anti-pluralist (Mudde 2004: 543), as it challenges traditional 
parties and the traditional political class but also undermines the legitimacy 
of a fractured unity of the people in the name of various conflicting interests. 
In this sense, populism features aspects of political modernity and anti-mo-
dernity, and develops across the decline of the traditional élite and the birth 
and institutionalization of the new élite (Hayward 1996: 20).
Therefore, the issues to be addressed are how the “people” become a politi-
cal symbol, who promotes their politicization and why, and lastly, the process 
of establishment of the enemies of the people. In other words, this theoretical 
perspective is a prerequisite to observe how populism develops in advanced 
democracies, starting with the role of the “political entrepreneurs” of disen-
chantment, that is to say populist leaders.
4. Populism and leadership: from ideology to strategy
Identifying populism as a political family of parties with its own internal 
coherence in terms of programme policies and identity contents is likely to 
be misleading when trying to understand a phenomenon that, as part of its 
chameleonic ambiguity, uses an instrument that can engage in dialogue and 
merge with existing political ideologies and families (Taggart 2000; Taguieff 
2003; Mudde 2004). In what has become one of the most cited perspectives 
for the analysis of populism, the common conceptual reference is connected 
to the vision of populism as a «thin-ideology» (Mudde 2004: 543; Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2012: 8). A thin-ideology based on society being divided into two 
homogeneous and conflicting groups: on the one hand, the «pure people», on 
the other the corrupt élites who identify and legitimise politics as an expres-
sion of general will for the «good of the people». The core of populist ideol-
ogy essentially comprises an appeal to the people, holders of moral virtue, 
and an anti-establishment appeal, in favour of restoring popular sovereignty, 
which interprets and recovers the redemptive politics constituting democracy 
(Stanley 2008: 102). Although populism has various manifestations, certain 
common elements can be identified in the centrality of the people and their 
uniformity, in anti-elitism, in the use of tools of direct democracy, in the crea-
tion of an external enemy, in the amplification of a “crisis”, in the direct style 
of communication aimed at simplifying complexity, in the polarization of po-
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litical positions and, in reference to the leadership, in the use of the image of 
an outsider and the plebiscitary bond between leader and voters (Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2008: 6; Rooduijn 2014: 578).
If however we set out to expand the set of characteristics shared by the 
different forms of populism, even if we only refer to the “political” populisms 
of contemporary democracies, the presence of common elements does not re-
duce the different forms of populism in differing political systems. Interpret-
ing populism as a system of coherent ideas behind a well-defined political 
family would require the existence of a common interpretation of the world 
and of political reality in terms of design, in terms of a strategy of cognitive 
simplification, in terms of a process of recognition of a specific social constitu-
ency, of shared symbolic codes, values and policies. Moreover, it should not be 
underestimated that “populist” tends to be a pejorative qualification, attrib-
uted from the outside, and not the name by which the members of a specific 
party or the development of a proper political theory are identified.
The problem therefore is not just identifying how much antagonism there 
is in populism, but also if it is present and what form it adopts in the political 
construction of a sovereign people and the opposition to representative distor-
tions of liberal democracy (Panizza 2005: 3-4). In broader terms, if populism 
is presented as a reaffirmation of popular sovereignty, not to restore the legiti-
macy of power but rather to exercise it against the élites, then the criterion can 
be extended to a wide range of political actors and parties that vary in nature. 
By continuing along the lines of an inclusive criterion, starting from the basic 
definition of populism, we risk linking a variety of phenomena so broad to the 
concept as to make it heuristically ineffective, or at least redundant in terms 
of classic concepts found in socio-political literature. In so doing, what comes 
into play is a basic form of populism as a show of no-confidence and hostil-
ity by citizens towards politics, or populism in the form of communicative 
rhetoric, a populism of insiders characterized by anti-establishment sentiment 
within the party or government, hard populism understood as a negation of 
democratic conflict in the name of hyper-politicization, and lastly, populism in 
the form of an ideological addendum to other and pre-existing political forms 
(De Beus 2009). Moreover, if a negative reaction to representative democracy 
shares different phenomena, the consistency of populism is seen in relation to 
the political, institutional and policy alternatives to the mainstream politics 
advanced by various leaders and parties. In the active political and policy 
part, populism is forced to resort to pre-existing structured ideologies, thereby 
dismissing the phenomenon from time to time as mainly populist neoliberal-
ism, populist socialism or national populism (Mudde 2007). It follows from 
the above that the most important dimension for the analysis of the concept is 
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not so much populism as an ideology, but rather, if the phenomenon in ques-
tion corresponds (or otherwise) to a particular process of politicization of the 
opposition to traditional representative politics, and if it features characteris-
tics that differ from those of other parties, movements and leaders.
Even if bottom-up forms of populism that are not necessarily linked to 
leadership can be found, in advanced democracies it is difficult to disregard 
political entrepreneurs who activate political opposition to the system. Also, 
if we consider populism as a cleavage challenging the system, it is possible 
to recover what has been described under the politicization of cleavages and 
perceive the development of populism not as a simple type of regime, political 
movement or party model, or even as an ideology, but rather as a particular 
process of political mobilization ( Jansen 2011: 82). Every process of mobili-
zation in democracies consists of certain steps and political actors included 
in the struggle for power by constructing a political offer that can activate 
opposition in society, but which needs to be organized and articulated, with 
an identity and political form, by a political entrepreneur or an alliance of 
political entrepreneurs (Bartolini 2000: 13). In shifting from a party-based 
democracy to a democracy where personalization is a common trend, the 
key is to identify how certain leaders succeed in producing the politicization 
of sentiments of detachment and distrust towards the political class and tradi-
tional parties and offering themselves as the “voice and image” of the people 
and “personifying” those exact same political options.
It is certainly worth reiterating that not every process of personalization 
and not every new political rift can be linked to populism. A disintermediated 
appeal to voters is the characteristic trait of personalization, but it is in the 
strategy adopted to make a politically relevant appeal to the people that we 
can identify the specifics of the populist sub-type of personalized leadership. 
Populism, as a political strategy, is the process by which a personalized leader 
activates an anti-establishment cleavage at political level by appealing to the 
people, who do not pre-exist in their “community” dimension, but which he 
himself moulds, based on conditions of no-confidence, disenchantment or al-
ienation from politics (Weyland 2001; Roberts 2015; Moffitt 2016). If it wants 
to be a political and electoral option, populism needs a process of politiciza-
tion and institutionalization, but where anti-political and anti-party sentiment 
is not sufficient; what is needed is action that makes the invisible visible, with 
a recognisable identity. In other words, political representation still needs sub-
jects who activate the process. In this sense, populist strategy features two 
contradictions. Firstly, the fact that populism takes on the form of a political 
party operating in the electoral arena, whilst still making anti-party appeals 
and challenging party democracy. Secondly, even if it is in the name of the 
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people’s sovereignty and to reject the corrupt élites, populism criticises repre-
sentative democracy. It is only according to the rules and guarantees of liberal 
democracy that “realized populism” can emerge.
As observed, a populist leader does not only operate the politicization of 
collective resentment, but also a more pervasive construction of the people 
and their mobilization. The populist leader does not present himself as a rep-
resentative of the people, but as an integral part of the people, as a servant 
leader, as the people’s spokesperson, as a member of the same “imagined com-
munity” he built and manipulated. The populist leader does not “meet” the 
people, he «creates the people of populism»; he embodies them and gives 
shape and form to a substance that in truth, does not already have a devel-
oped dimension in the social body (Moffitt 2016: 64). Populist opposition cre-
ates legitimacy and a sentiment of trust and confidence in its leaders, thanks 
to the glue that is identity mobilization, and by exploiting the political oppor-
tunities arising from the processes of social and political change under way.
5. The “people” as a political construction
The strategic action of the populist leader relates to the social and political 
characteristics of the context in which it is adopted, and in particular, to the 
type of democratization and modernization of a country and to the type of 
political culture that distinguishes a political system. The appeal of the popu-
list leader is therefore presented in two ways: by affirming and recalling an 
“imagined” community of unity, which can be traced back to the ideal of 
“general will” and which does not permit fragmentation and minority; or, 
by addressing the common man, the man on the street, who remains in his 
private dimension, who does not participate in collective processes, with the 
exception of media build-up of common sense elevated to «everyone’s wish» 
status (Weyland 2001: 15). The relevance of the populist leader is not only 
connected to the activation of a personalized bond, which, as such, would 
reflect the personalization of politics and not connote a populist specificity, 
except in terms of pure rhetoric. In this paper, we have assumed that populist 
strategy is not a simple plebiscitary mobilization, and that it cannot be linked 
to simple psychological behaviour, a particular social class or a series of poli-
cies (Muller 2016: 40). It is not enough to simply oppose the élites; an appeal 
and the construction of a people is necessary, people with moral characteris-
tics ahead of political ones.
The construction of cleavage establishment vs. anti-establishment is not 
the aggregation and articulation of a specific social group’s interests, but rath-
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er the ability to create a collective recognition within a common definition of 
“people”; a heterogeneous people whose mobilization can lead to the simulta-
neous development of different interests amongst those who are mobilized and 
in the mobilising leader, without the latter being the subject of protest ( Jansen 
2011: 85). This strategy, aside from the “mystique of the people”, does not 
subordinate a political community to a pre-existing social body, which can be 
replicated by the same political family in various national contexts, but rather 
articulates a political offer anchored in specific contextual cases. The instru-
ments of this process are able to manipulate and to use identity to counter, to 
legitimise a heterogeneous, and potentially conflicting, group of interests and 
expectations. In particular, the populist strategy avails itself of a Manichaean 
simplification, i.e. “good” and “bad”, friends and enemies that is instrumental 
in the creation of solidarity amongst socially diverse individuals. The person-
alization of populist leadership therefore operates as a form of disintermedia-
tion, similar to the personalized leadership of audience democracies, but it 
differs from the latter in that populism makes a moral reference to a primitive 
order where political representative mediation is not necessary and the leader 
stands as a symbol of an all-embracing people (Hermet 2001). 
Populist mobilization by the populist leader requires, first and foremost, 
a definition of the internal and external confines of the people (De La Torre 
2015: 5). In other words, if strategic action and mobilization are done in “the 
name of the people”, who are the people of the populists? The appeal made 
to the people varies, depending on social, economic and political context, and 
refers to ethnic, civic, collectivist or particularistic nationalism (De Raadt, 
Hollanders and Krouwel 2004). In broader terms, the various forms of pop-
ulism refer to conceptions of the people, which underline the dimension of the 
people as sovereign, as class, as nations, or which underline the condition of 
the people, in the form of «underdogs» or the «everyman» (Canovan 1984: 
315). However, whereas the conception of the sovereign people recalls the dem-
os and the direct re-appropriation of sovereignty, the social space in which the 
populist strategy is adopted for the construction of the people as an “imagined 
community” is forced to face the social phenomena surrounding the crisis of 
the middle class in advanced societies and the creation of a social divide be-
tween the winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2012). This perspec-
tive is primarily the result of the emergence and progressive evolution of the 
parties of the new radical right in the midst of a «silent counter-revolution» 
(Ignazi 2003), in which the winners and losers of new, global social processes 
have to deal with the impact of phenomena such as immigration, European 
integration, insecurity due to the absence of welfare systems and job prospects 
(Bornschier 2010: 37-38). 
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5.1 The crisis of the middle class and politicized insecurity
The relationship between the middle class and populism is particularly cen-
tral to a socio-economic crisis or when the perception of insecurity lends itself 
to the manipulation of outside leaders; a phenomenon not unknown to demo-
cratic political systems, cited by Lipset in reference to McCarthyism and Pou-
jadism as the activation of an extremism of the centre within the middle class 
in a period of «insoluble frustrations of those who feel cut off from the main 
trends of modern society» (Lipset [1960] 1963: 178). The prospective decline 
of the middle class does not only involve the worsening of economic condi-
tions for those professions belonging to the middle class. Indeed, the middle 
class represents a «nebula, comprising various social figures, but which some-
how can be distinguished in its entirety» (Bagnasco 2016: 8), whose common 
traits refer to education levels, lifestyle, consumption habits, job security and 
life. From the moment the middle class begins to fray at the seams, in addition 
to a perception of status deprivation and inconsistency, a problem involving 
democracy arises. The reason for this is that the middle class in European 
societies is the political result of a compromise by the welfare state, a project 
of politics and policies benefitting democratic stability.
What happens if the middle class in crisis is radicalized? The middle class 
can essentially develop an extremism of the centre, which, if not linked to 
the «fascism of the centre» claimed by Lipset ([1960] 1963), activates politi-
cal behaviours in a political context ranging from the reactionary defence of 
threatened interests, to calls for protectionism, to willingness to accept au-
thoritarian hypotheses (Touraine 2002: 239). In the current state of Euro-
pean societies, the middle class has become a place of insecurity, especially in 
the face of the social regulation of the welfare system, which had accompa-
nied growth and rising social prospects, but which is no longer there; at the 
same time, the politics of the nation-state has limited power when it comes to 
playing a role in national regulation processes. The combined effect of these 
processes does not imply the end of the middle class as a set of professions be-
longing to the tiers of social stratification, but faced with an escalating crisis 
and increasing risks, there is the possibility that social demotion and panic 
will activate populist and totalitarian forms of defence, as was the case in the 
1930s (Bagnasco 2016: 150-151). Based on the analysis of Bagnasco (Idem: 
204), political change has yet to activate extreme political forms, because the 
current stage is one of tension and anxiety, not of panic amongst the middle 
classes; however, the economic and financial crisis of 2008 contributed sig-
nificantly to the emergence of politicized dissent on the part of new political 
entrepreneurs, introducing the simplification of political complexity through 
the gap between the “fragile” and the delegitimized élites. 
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Such a radical change in the European context does not occur in a system 
without ideological anchors or even in terms of the complete disintegration 
of social affiliations; it happens with the birth and development of anti-es-
tablishment subjects from the new right and the new left. In this sense, the 
people of the new radical and populist right are built around the concept 
of «differential nativism», of nationalist populism that loses the ideological 
character of the traditional neo-fascist right and openly opposes multicul-
turalism and globalization (Betz 2003: 195). The people of the new populist 
right are composed of the losers of globalization, whose identity is not built in 
the name of the recovered participation by the individual citizen in political 
processes, but rather with the recognition and trust accorded to top leader-
ship by an (alleged) unitary constituency (Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2007). Since 
the economic and financial crisis of 2008, a populist dimension has opened 
in the new radical left, through new political formations that no longer cor-
respond to the traditional social constituency of the 20th century left of the 
workers (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; March 2011; Mudde 2017). De-
spite the emphasis placed by the new radical/populist left on participatory 
and deliberative processes for the democratization of democracy, as well as 
the emphasis placed on the tools for participation made possible by the new 
media, once again the role of the leadership in the construction of the people 
constitutes a key element. The populism of the left has a particular charac-
teristic which recalls the theory redefining the political processes of Laclau 
and those who speak of the “theory of discourse” to explain populism. La-
clau links the dynamic to a post-Marxist perspective where populism takes 
on a role that can be subversive compared to the existing order but also able 
to reconstruct a new order when the previous one is in a state of political and 
institutional crisis. From this perspective, populism corresponds to a highly 
political process, in which the «discourse» of the leader produces a social 
construction of the «politician» by formulating the fragmented questions of 
society around a «new core» (Laclau 2008: 169). In other words, for Laclau, 
populism becomes politics itself; it is not based on a pre-determined system of 
class, but it does correspond to a political style that creates identities based on 
«equivalential chains of unsatisfied demands» (Ibidem), thanks to the ability 
of the leader to exercise a new hegemony aimed at creating a homogeneous 
people, no longer identified by the concept of class. Apart from the highlight-
ed differences between the populism of the new right and the new left, what 
emerges from the analysis of the phenomenon in European democracies is 
that the leader plays a key role in activating a political strategy focused on 
the identity dimension of the “people” and on the inability for action and on 
the responsibility of the traditional power élite for the crisis.
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6. Populist leadership and charismatic leadership
In the politicization of dissent, which emerges in the crisis of political repre-
sentation and the growing personalization of politics and leadership, there is 
frequently an association between the populist and charismatic dimensions of 
the leadership. Like populism, charisma is the subject of numerous interpreta-
tions in terms of its potential use in modern democracies. Compared to We-
ber’s original argument, according to which charisma is not a quality present 
in every form of leadership, but which does expressly refer to an individual 
endowed with supernatural power or to personal or objective carriers of cha-
risma (Weber 1978: 1134), the debate on charisma in democracies focuses on 
those who support its presence in modern democratic politics together with 
rationalization processes (Cavalli 1981) and on those who refer to their own 
attribution of pre-modern politics (Loewenstein 1966). Without going into the 
debate on the foundations of charisma, if we assume that it is merely a form 
of rhetoric then it would be an empty signifier, a simple demagogic attribu-
tion based on the semblance of a leader, which differs from the leader as a 
personality (Cavalli 1987b: 105). The concept of charisma, and even more 
so the relationship between charisma and democracy, can be interpreted in 
different ways; however, what is fixed is the fact that charisma cannot be su-
perimposed by the concept of notoriety, the concept of political popularity or 
simple electoral success (Van der Brug and Mughan 2007: 31; Blondel and 
Thièbault 2010: 42). By examining the extraordinary nature and quality of a 
leader, we can observe how the emergence of charismatic leadership stands a 
greater chance in modern democracies marked by personalization processes 
and the absence of mass parties in the conditions Weber referred to and above 
all, in the ideological politics of the 20th century (Cavalli 1987a: 324). Certain 
conditions highlighted by Weber are still valid, starting with situations of ex-
traordinary crisis for the possible emergence of a leader, a sense of mission 
and the presence of certain basic, leader-like characteristics, such as passion, 
defined as dedication to a cause, a sense of responsibility and far-sightedness 
(Weber 1919), conditions that lie at the heart of that ability to strike a balance 
between ethics of conviction and ethics of rationality in politics. The «politics 
of the extraordinary» is therefore availed of certain characteristics referring 
to the delegitimization of the pre-existing order of symbols, politics, institu-
tions and values, with a new legitimation stemming from the charisma of the 
leader himself, the effect being radical change through the introduction of a 
solution to the crisis (Kalyvas 2008: 65).
Even in the partial similarity between the two phenomena in terms of 
crisis, anti-establishment and personalization, we can distinguish charismatic 
personalism from populist personalism, starting with the characteristics of 
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charisma in democratic systems, and by highlighting the differences in terms 
of the strategy adopted by the populist leader. Indeed, whilst the degree to 
which the leader controls the party, the disintermediation of his relationship 
with the voters, the personalization of power within the establishment and 
the dynamics of outsiders and the anti-establishment are all traits shared by 
populism and charisma, as noted by Pappas (2016: 3), the reconstruction of a 
new political and institutional order adopts the characteristics of radicalism 
that go well beyond the delegitimization of the traditional political class.
One cannot ignore the fact that the overlapping of populism and cha-
risma is cited in extensive literature, particularly in that which analysed the 
emergence of the new radical right in the 1990s and which identified as its 
main characteristics a lack of institutionalization and reliance on charismatic 
leaders around whom dissent towards mainstream politics formed (Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Taggart 2000). Populist lead-
ership is frequently associated with charisma, especially in the leaders of the 
new radical right, and with an overlapping of other phenomena in reference 
to both the characteristics of the leaders and the personalization of politics 
and top leadership, and the political parties. Recognising in a populist leader 
the attribute of charisma does not prevent a part of these terms from be-
ing expressed as “similar” or prevent us from suggesting that we are dealing 
with synonyms. Taggart (2000: 169), for example, states that populism has a 
certain propensity for charismatic leadership, but this is an indication of its 
greater predilection for a strong leadership. Even more indicative of an asso-
ciation that is likely to increase the problems of populism is Kriesi’s analysis 
(2014), which, on the one hand, recognises the charisma in populist leaders 
as communication without intermediaries, and on the other, recognises how 
this quality “facilitates” populism without exhausting the phenomenon per sé.
Therefore, although there is still the tendency to highlight charisma as 
an inherent attribute of populism, a new perspective was recently developed, 
which, at the very least, problematises the juxtaposition of these two phenomena 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Jansen 2011; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2014; 
Pappas 2016). Those perspectives that are wary of expressing charisma as an 
attribute of populist leadership begin with different considerations. It is not only 
the emphasis placed on populism as a thin-ideology that has limited the neces-
sary presence of charismatic leadership, but also the more general perspective 
of non-charismatic personalism (Ansell and Fish 1999). When applied to pop-
ulism, it has led to the description of the neo-populist leader as just “one of us”, 
one of the people, and to the consideration that the trust accorded to him is 
inextricably linked to the achievement of a goal, to a period of media coverage 
or to the perception that there is no other alternative (Miscoiu 2013: 23-24). 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA296
Indeed, attributing charismatic qualities to populist leaders is the result of 
too broad an interpretation of the two concepts, given that the extraordinary 
qualities of charisma are made to coincide mainly with a demagogic attitude 
and media popularity. As observed by Panizza (2005: 19-20), the populist 
leader builds his message through symbolic storytelling, featuring myths, par-
tial ideological references and data use, but no programme, and by focusing 
on his success outside of politics, particularly his unfamiliarity with the politi-
cal system, its rules and, even more so, his disposition towards «political cor-
rectness». The populist leader depoliticises politics and hyper-politicises social 
relations, in the sense that he uses his private, professional and business life 
as proof of his being a successful outsider, a “self-made man”; in so doing, he 
testifies to the opportunity for social ascent by anyone, since he himself is part 
of and equal to the people.
Based on what has been argued thus far, we can see that the key aspect 
of the charismatic leader’s message is not to oppose politics, but rather to 
transform the system he symbolises. Otherwise, the populist leader has to 
continuously reiterate his hostility towards the system to keep a tight rein 
on his followers, without introducing elements, such as programme choices 
or defined policies that could potentially divide his followers. Moreover, if 
charisma presupposes a direct and emotionally intense relationship between 
the leader and his followers, then it is possible that not all political and party 
manifestations of populism are characterized by complete acceptance of the 
leader. Moreover, the actual link between leader and followers can have a 
charismatic connotation, not at electorate level, but for the faithful followers 
of the leader, resulting in a different and more restricted connotation that is 
not for the masses but rather an example of «coterie charisma» (Eatwell 2006; 
McDonnell 2015). 
Despite the fact that charisma is connected to the foundations of an ad-
vanced democracy, it features certain characteristics that are not immediately 
translatable and that, in some cases, are nothing like populism. Firstly, the 
fact that the main and ideological reference of populism is the people and not 
the leader’s charisma means that popular sovereignty and a mythologized 
community play a pre-ordained role instead of the leader himself. Secondly, 
the fact that the charismatic leader is not “equal” to the people; instead, he 
has a quality that makes him “superior”, and as such, he becomes an example 
and a guide for the people, who go on to radically redefine themselves accord-
ing to their values, not by virtue of a pre-existing imagined community, but by 
a new community founded “by” and “on” the leader himself. Claiming that 
charisma is inherent to populist leadership would only lead to the identifica-
tion of a rhetorical and demagogic attribute for this quality in the language 
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of politics, and not to the establishment of a social relationship based on the 
legitimising role of an emotionally intense relationship, in which the followers 
perceive the leader as the “solution” to the crisis.
The populist leader is he who manages to activate politically a series of 
contrasting feelings, interests and questions formulated in a society undergo-
ing profound changes in terms of democracy and political representation, by 
building a “discourse”, a “narrative” that adheres perfectly to the disorienta-
tion of individuals, without necessarily offering a solution, but with a resound-
ing echo. It therefore becomes crucial to capture “the mood” of the people 
through opinion polls, by standardising an appeal that is not structured but 
latent, that makes no claim to new policies. In such a dynamic, it is easy to see 
the representative weakness of traditional political subjects, on the one hand, 
and the weakness of a civil society that is not activated by horizontal ties of an 
associative nature, on the other. Opposing the political class becomes a short-
cut to turning to a new leader, instead of launching critical reflection to over-
come the disintegration of basic social and political ties. In this sense, Taguieff 
(2003: 106-107) refers expressly to the ability to manipulate and elaborate sym-
bolic codes and simplified cognitive tools by three different types of «populist 
demagogues», whose characteristics are not just necessarily hybridized, but 
co-present in single leaders. The populist leader can therefore act as a Tribune 
addressing the people to win their trust, a leader who works on the shared feel-
ings of the people to manipulate them, and lastly, a player of the media who, 
by means of his abilities to stimulate the collective “dream” of the people, by-
passes and counters the methods adopted by the élites he is opposing. 
7. Conclusions: populism beyond rhetoric
In conclusion, how useful is populism when analysing the politics of advanced 
democracies? The development of a political sociology of populism is a way 
to analyse the changes to the redefinition of political actors and contents and, 
in particular, the shift from a democracy forged “by” and “on” parties where 
personalized leadership becomes the only trustworthy actor. In this paper, 
we have assumed that populism is not just an anti-establishment attitude or a 
mere show of empathy generated by communication skills; otherwise, instead 
of analysing the concept of populism, we could have interpreted the phenom-
ena in light of rhetorical and demagogic skills. At the same time, the populist 
leader does not overlap with the more general trend towards personalization 
of the top leadership, and the populist leadership is not synonymous with 
charismatic leadership.
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The perspective adopted in this paper aims to bring together populism 
and the representation gap created between mainstream politics and the citi-
zens. On the one hand, society no longer has the social layout of the twenti-
eth century, and it has been overrun by insecurity and tension in the middle 
classes as a result of the crisis in the traditional welfare system and the re-
spatialization of financial and migration flows stemming from globalization. 
On the other, politics is aware that the parties of the establishment have failed 
to re-define responsiveness in terms of identity and policy. Added to this is 
the proceduralization of democracy, which is without a suitable component 
to generate trust and supranational regulation, as is the case of the European 
Union, which is bound to non-majority institutions and by an incomplete po-
litical process. However, we would be unable to comprehend the importance 
attributed to the populist leader from the analytical perspective adopted in 
this paper, if we did not analyse two additional processes that set apart soci-
ety and advanced democracies, i.e. the personalization of politics to identify 
and disintermediate and the strategy behind the construction of a “people”, 
holders of morality and virtue and therefore in conflict with the power of the 
corrupt and self-referential establishment.
The problem is not determining whether or not leadership is important, 
but rather what leadership we are talking about in reference to populism at 
a time when political phenomena can no longer focus exclusively on the par-
ties as collective organizations. The personalization of leader democracy indi-
cates that strengthening a leader’s power occurs at the expense of intermedi-
ate bodies and organizations, but it is also a process of elaboration for policy 
or ideology within parties that change in terms of organization and function 
compared to mass parties, but which are also pre-existing and survive the 
leader. Radically put, the populist leader operates the “politics of disinterme-
diation”, a politics of anti-politics, i.e. he transforms overcoming intermediate 
bodies in traditional politics into value and identity, the glue and strategy of 
his appeal to the people. A strategy in the struggle for power, that sees in the 
delegitimization of the establishment’s traditional politics the tool by which 
to gain consensus. The juxtaposition between populism and charisma is also 
analysed, not only because of the presence of non-charismatic populisms or 
personalization, but also because of the intrinsic and constitutive difference 
between the conceptual cores of the two phenomena. The populist leader be-
comes “one of the people” and puts the people in a position of supreme moral 
virtue, ahead of all political virtue, turning his anti-establishment appeal into 
his very own political programme and action. Charisma, from the perspective 
of modern democracy, confirms its ability to solve a crisis thanks to a process 
that focuses on a quality of the leader that goes beyond rhetoric and which 
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does not put the leader next to the people but above them. Charisma creates a 
solution, whereas populism creates a constructed image of the people that, in 
political action, is an end in itself. Moreover, confidence in the populist leader 
is conditioned by the similarity in claims and it does not set in motion the 
acknowledgment of a leader whose bond is founded on the people’s faith in his 
ability to be the bearer of a new political order. If in the populist leadership 
the appeal to the people is instrumental in the pars destruens of “politicising the 
protest”, then in charismatic leadership what prevails in the pars costruens is 
the “great reform” where a previous political reform has failed. We can there-
fore advance an interpretation of the phenomena, according to which both 
populist leadership, and by extension a populist democracy, and charismatic 
leadership, and by extension a charismatic plebiscitary democracy, constitute 
different subtypes of leader democracy as a general process, marking the shift 
from a democracy of ideologies to a mass post-party democracy.
Moreover, in light of the processes described above, it is possible to ar-
ticulate a gradation of populism and introduce the difference between soft 
and hard populism. Hard populism can be traced back to an outside leader, 
an outsider unfamiliar with the party system who nonetheless does not place 
himself outside the perimeter of representative democracy but instead is fo-
cused on opposing the establishment. Soft populism is one of the strategic 
resources that can be mobilized by an outsider within a traditional party to 
replace the old dominant coalition, through a symbolic discourse opposing 
the establishment “inside” the party itself. What remains however is the am-
biguity of an excessive expansion of soft populism, given that the opposition 
to the establishment, the personalization of leadership and the use of «bad 
manners» in political discourse (Moffitt 2016) are not sufficient for there to be 
populism. Populism as a strategy for politicization requires the “construction 
of the people” as a homogeneous whole, an imagined community of virtue, to 
be preserved from the corruption of the élite. If the appeal to the people were 
only based on the search for catch-all consensus, then it would be difficult 
to distinguish a populist leader from a personalized one; the people of the 
populists are one, pure and as such, subject to a unitary representation that 
does not concede defeat on diverging interests. In other words, the catch-all 
formula is compatible with the pluralism of political conflict, whereas if innate 
to populism, it is the politicization of the people as a whole that results in the 
de-politicization of conflict in democracy. 
In conclusion, the challenge for political sociology is not just to analyse 
populism as a crisis of the bureaucratic-professional party in terms of loss of 
importance for assemblies and the intermediate political class, of the insignifi-
cance of organizations on the territory, of the loss of representative capacity of 
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traditional political identities. If tackled on the basis of the above indicators, 
populism lends itself to a heuristically sterile label, or rather to being referred 
to as a nominal variant of the concepts that have always existed in socio-polit-
ical research. Conversely, if considered as a particular strategy adopted by the 
new entrepreneurs of politics in an attempt to politically activate fragmented 
social bases by making the appeal against the establishment the lowest com-
mon denominator of identity, then populism can represent a theoretically and 
empirically stimulating phenomenon in a period of profound change in civil 
society and in Europe’s political society.
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